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HELP - utter ridiculousness UPDATE
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<blockquote data-quote="Sheila" data-source="post: 5579" data-attributes="member: 23"><p>Federal and State law definitely supersedes policy.</p><p></p><p>I pulled <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20070715010943/http://www.asbj.com/199906/0699schoollaw.html" target="_blank">https://web.archive.org/web/20070715010943/http://www.asbj.com/199906/0699schoollaw.html</a> for you. </p><p></p><p></p><p>A Duty to the Disabled</p><p>A Supreme Court ruling reaffirms the requirements of the IDEA</p><p>By Benjamin Dowling-Sendor</p><p></p><p>Severely disabled students have a right to health services that support their education, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled, and as long as those services can be provided by someone other than a physician, it is the school district's obligation to provide them. The recent decision in Cedar Rapids Community School District v. Garret F. reaffirms a 15-year-old Supreme Court ruling on disabled students and clarifies the extent of medical services required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).</p><p></p><p>In the earlier case -- Irving Independent School District v. Tatro, 1984 -- the court ruled that the IDEA requires school districts to provide (and pay for) "supportive services" to a disabled child that may be necessary to help the child benefit from special education, including health services, as long as they can be provided by personnel other than a physician. The decision in the Cedar Rapids case reaffirms that ruling.</p><p></p><p>The Supreme Court ruled for Garret, affirming the decisions of the administrative law judge, the Federal District Court, and the 8th Circuit by a 7-2 vote. Writing for the majority, Justice John Paul Stevens reviewed the court's decision in Tatro about the scope of a school district's duty under the IDEA to provide health services for a disabled student. In Tatro, the court interpreted the IDEA as requiring a two-step analysis for determining the scope of a school district's obligation to provide "related services" to a disabled child.</p><p></p><p>The first question is whether the requested services are included within the "supportive services" that a school district must provide. The IDEA states that school districts must provide "related services" and defines that to mean "transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services ... as may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education." The statute gives as examples such services as speech pathology, audiology, psychological counseling, and social services. The IDEA also states that "supportive services" include "medical services" but says that "such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only."</p><p></p><p>The second question under Tatro, then, is whether health services requested by a student, such as the services requested by Garret's family, are "medical services" that the statute expressly excludes from the scope of its coverage.</p><p></p><p>Stevens explained that in Tatro, the court ruled that the medical services excluded from the IDEA's coverage "referred only to services that must be performed by a physician, and not to school health services" that can be performed by other personnel. For example, in Tatro, the Supreme Court ruled that the IDEA requires a school district to provide a specific form of health care -- clean intermittent catheterization -- that is often, though not always, performed by a nurse. In short, Stevens explained, the term "medical services" in the IDEA "does not embrace all forms of care that might loosely be described as 'medical' in other contexts." The term pertains only to health care services that must be performed by a physician.</p><p></p><p>The district's argument</p><p>As Stevens observed, the school district did not argue that any of the types of care needed by Garret could be excluded from the IDEA in light of Tatro. After all, catheterization can be performed by a school nurse or other trained personnel, and it was the very form of care that the Supreme Court ruled was covered by the IDEA in Tatro. Also, the school district already provides to other students most of the other services requested by Garret's family, and the tasks required to operate Garret's ventilator can be performed by personnel other than physicians.</p><p></p><p>Instead, the school district proposed a new analysis for deciding whether health care is excluded from the scope of the IDEA as a "medical service." The school district focused on the "combined and continuous character" of the care Garret required and proposed a four-part analysis based on the 6th Circuit's decision in Neely and the 2nd Circuit's decision in Detsel. Under the proposed test, a court would consider the following four factors to decide whether requested health services are "medical services" excluded under the IDEA: "(1) whether the care is continuous or intermittent, (2) whether existing school health personnel can provide the service, (3) the cost of the service, and (4) the potential consequences if the service is not properly performed."</p><p></p><p>Stevens rejected the district's proposed test, saying the four factors have no bearing on whether particular services are "medical." "Continuous services," Stevens wrote, "may be more costly and may require additional school personnel, but they are not thereby more 'medical.'" Stevens added that the Tatro rule that "limits the medical services exemption to physician services" is a reasonable interpretation of the IDEA.</p><p></p><p>Stevens pointed out that the four factors suggested by the district actually boil down to a concern about cost. The school district can train employees who are not physicians to perform the services Garret needs to stay in school. As Stevens observed, the district's four-factor proposal "seeks to establish a kind of undue-burden exemption primarily based on the cost of the requested services."</p><p></p><p>However, Stevens noted, the IDEA does not define the terms "related services" and "medical services" on the basis of cost. Although the Supreme Court considered the potential financial burden imposed on states and school districts in interpreting the IDEA in Tatro, the IDEA does not make cost a determinative test of the scope of "related services" or of excluded "medical services." Stevens explained that the role of the courts is limited to interpreting the IDEA, not to amending it to add cost as a determinative factor. Only Congress can amend the IDEA.</p><p></p><p>"This case is about whether meaningful access to the public schools will be assured, not the level of education that a school must finance once access is attained," Stevens concluded. "It is undisputed that the services at issue must be provided if Garret is to remain in school. Under the statute, our precedent, and the purposes of the IDEA, the district must fund such 'related services' in order to help guarantee that students like Garret are integrated into the public schools."</p><p></p><p>The dissent</p><p>Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the dissenting opinion, in which Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined. Thomas argued that the court should overrule its previous decision in Tatro. He contended that the definition of "medical services" should hinge on whether the services are medical in nature rather than who provides the services. Even if Tatro were correct, Thomas maintained, it should mean merely that school districts must provide disabled children with health services "that school nurses can perform as part of their normal duties."</p><p></p><p>In Tatro, the evidence showed that school nurses in the Irving Independent School District were authorized to perform services similar to the clean intermittent catheterization at issue in that case. In contrast, Thomas contended, a school nurse cannot attend to Garret's health needs and to the health needs of other children because Garret needs continuous, one-on-one care throughout the school day. In other words, the school district must hire an additional employee to serve Garret's health needs alone.</p><p></p><p>Despite Justice Thomas' real-world concerns about costs, the majority opinion in Garret F. gives school districts a bright-line test of the scope of the kinds of health services that the IDEA requires them to provide. The tests proposed by the district and Thomas, on the other hand, would establish murky criteria that could not be consistently applied from case to case. The results will no doubt be expensive for school districts, but, as Justice Stevens observed, they are the results required by the IDEA to accomplish the goal of integrating disabled children into the public schools.</p><p></p><p>Benjamin Dowling-Sendor, an authority on school law, is an assistant appellate defender of North Carolina in Durham.</p><p></p><p>Here's another one @ <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20051102035811/http://www.kansped.org/ksde/fridayfacts/ff1999-03.pdf#search=%22Supreme%20Court%2C%20Tatro%2C%201984" target="_blank">https://web.archive.org/web/20051102035811/http://www.kansped.org/ksde/fridayfacts/ff1999-03.pdf#search="Supreme Court, Tatro, 1984</a></p><p></p><p>Friday Facts March 5, 1999</p><p></p><p>ALERT--U.S. Supreme Court says:</p><p></p><p><strong>Related Related services under IDEA includes All medical services except those required to be</strong></p><p><strong>provided by a licensed physician.</strong></p><p></p><p>On March 3, 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered its decision in the Cedar Rapids</p><p>Sch. Dist. v. Garret F. case concerning school districts obligation to provide school</p><p>health services as required related services under IDEA.</p><p></p><p>The latter is via the Kansas State Department of Education. Your sd must not have gotten their copy. </p><p></p><p>Let us know how it goes.</p></blockquote><p></p>
[QUOTE="Sheila, post: 5579, member: 23"] Federal and State law definitely supersedes policy. I pulled [url]https://web.archive.org/web/20070715010943/http://www.asbj.com/199906/0699schoollaw.html[/url] for you. A Duty to the Disabled A Supreme Court ruling reaffirms the requirements of the IDEA By Benjamin Dowling-Sendor Severely disabled students have a right to health services that support their education, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled, and as long as those services can be provided by someone other than a physician, it is the school district's obligation to provide them. The recent decision in Cedar Rapids Community School District v. Garret F. reaffirms a 15-year-old Supreme Court ruling on disabled students and clarifies the extent of medical services required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). In the earlier case -- Irving Independent School District v. Tatro, 1984 -- the court ruled that the IDEA requires school districts to provide (and pay for) "supportive services" to a disabled child that may be necessary to help the child benefit from special education, including health services, as long as they can be provided by personnel other than a physician. The decision in the Cedar Rapids case reaffirms that ruling. The Supreme Court ruled for Garret, affirming the decisions of the administrative law judge, the Federal District Court, and the 8th Circuit by a 7-2 vote. Writing for the majority, Justice John Paul Stevens reviewed the court's decision in Tatro about the scope of a school district's duty under the IDEA to provide health services for a disabled student. In Tatro, the court interpreted the IDEA as requiring a two-step analysis for determining the scope of a school district's obligation to provide "related services" to a disabled child. The first question is whether the requested services are included within the "supportive services" that a school district must provide. The IDEA states that school districts must provide "related services" and defines that to mean "transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services ... as may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education." The statute gives as examples such services as speech pathology, audiology, psychological counseling, and social services. The IDEA also states that "supportive services" include "medical services" but says that "such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only." The second question under Tatro, then, is whether health services requested by a student, such as the services requested by Garret's family, are "medical services" that the statute expressly excludes from the scope of its coverage. Stevens explained that in Tatro, the court ruled that the medical services excluded from the IDEA's coverage "referred only to services that must be performed by a physician, and not to school health services" that can be performed by other personnel. For example, in Tatro, the Supreme Court ruled that the IDEA requires a school district to provide a specific form of health care -- clean intermittent catheterization -- that is often, though not always, performed by a nurse. In short, Stevens explained, the term "medical services" in the IDEA "does not embrace all forms of care that might loosely be described as 'medical' in other contexts." The term pertains only to health care services that must be performed by a physician. The district's argument As Stevens observed, the school district did not argue that any of the types of care needed by Garret could be excluded from the IDEA in light of Tatro. After all, catheterization can be performed by a school nurse or other trained personnel, and it was the very form of care that the Supreme Court ruled was covered by the IDEA in Tatro. Also, the school district already provides to other students most of the other services requested by Garret's family, and the tasks required to operate Garret's ventilator can be performed by personnel other than physicians. Instead, the school district proposed a new analysis for deciding whether health care is excluded from the scope of the IDEA as a "medical service." The school district focused on the "combined and continuous character" of the care Garret required and proposed a four-part analysis based on the 6th Circuit's decision in Neely and the 2nd Circuit's decision in Detsel. Under the proposed test, a court would consider the following four factors to decide whether requested health services are "medical services" excluded under the IDEA: "(1) whether the care is continuous or intermittent, (2) whether existing school health personnel can provide the service, (3) the cost of the service, and (4) the potential consequences if the service is not properly performed." Stevens rejected the district's proposed test, saying the four factors have no bearing on whether particular services are "medical." "Continuous services," Stevens wrote, "may be more costly and may require additional school personnel, but they are not thereby more 'medical.'" Stevens added that the Tatro rule that "limits the medical services exemption to physician services" is a reasonable interpretation of the IDEA. Stevens pointed out that the four factors suggested by the district actually boil down to a concern about cost. The school district can train employees who are not physicians to perform the services Garret needs to stay in school. As Stevens observed, the district's four-factor proposal "seeks to establish a kind of undue-burden exemption primarily based on the cost of the requested services." However, Stevens noted, the IDEA does not define the terms "related services" and "medical services" on the basis of cost. Although the Supreme Court considered the potential financial burden imposed on states and school districts in interpreting the IDEA in Tatro, the IDEA does not make cost a determinative test of the scope of "related services" or of excluded "medical services." Stevens explained that the role of the courts is limited to interpreting the IDEA, not to amending it to add cost as a determinative factor. Only Congress can amend the IDEA. "This case is about whether meaningful access to the public schools will be assured, not the level of education that a school must finance once access is attained," Stevens concluded. "It is undisputed that the services at issue must be provided if Garret is to remain in school. Under the statute, our precedent, and the purposes of the IDEA, the district must fund such 'related services' in order to help guarantee that students like Garret are integrated into the public schools." The dissent Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the dissenting opinion, in which Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined. Thomas argued that the court should overrule its previous decision in Tatro. He contended that the definition of "medical services" should hinge on whether the services are medical in nature rather than who provides the services. Even if Tatro were correct, Thomas maintained, it should mean merely that school districts must provide disabled children with health services "that school nurses can perform as part of their normal duties." In Tatro, the evidence showed that school nurses in the Irving Independent School District were authorized to perform services similar to the clean intermittent catheterization at issue in that case. In contrast, Thomas contended, a school nurse cannot attend to Garret's health needs and to the health needs of other children because Garret needs continuous, one-on-one care throughout the school day. In other words, the school district must hire an additional employee to serve Garret's health needs alone. Despite Justice Thomas' real-world concerns about costs, the majority opinion in Garret F. gives school districts a bright-line test of the scope of the kinds of health services that the IDEA requires them to provide. The tests proposed by the district and Thomas, on the other hand, would establish murky criteria that could not be consistently applied from case to case. The results will no doubt be expensive for school districts, but, as Justice Stevens observed, they are the results required by the IDEA to accomplish the goal of integrating disabled children into the public schools. Benjamin Dowling-Sendor, an authority on school law, is an assistant appellate defender of North Carolina in Durham. Here's another one @ [url]https://web.archive.org/web/20051102035811/http://www.kansped.org/ksde/fridayfacts/ff1999-03.pdf#search=%22Supreme%20Court%2C%20Tatro%2C%201984[/url] Friday Facts March 5, 1999 ALERT--U.S. Supreme Court says: [B]Related Related services under IDEA includes All medical services except those required to be provided by a licensed physician.[/B] On March 3, 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered its decision in the Cedar Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Garret F. case concerning school districts obligation to provide school health services as required related services under IDEA. The latter is via the Kansas State Department of Education. Your sd must not have gotten their copy. Let us know how it goes. [/QUOTE]
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